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Abstract 
 
The Cloud Computing concept offers dynamically scalable 
resources provisioned as a service over the Internet. Economic 
benefits are the main driver for the Cloud, since it promises the 
reduction of capital expenditure and operational expenditure. 
In order for this to become reality, however, there are still some 
challenges to be solved. Amongst these are security and trust 
issues, since the user’s data has to be released to the Cloud and 
thus leaves the protection sphere of the data owner. Most of the 
discussions on these topics are mainly driven by arguments 
related to organisational means. This paper focuses on various 
security issues arising from the usage of Cloud services and 
especially by the rapid development of Cloud computing arena. 
It also discusses basic security model followed by various High 
Level Security threats in the industry. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, 
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction. Cloud computing architecture, 
just like any other system, is categorized into two main 
sections: Front End and Back End. Front End can be end 
user or client or any application (i.e. web browser etc.) 
which is using cloud services. Back End is the network of 
servers with any computer program and data storage system. 
It is usually assumed that cloud contains infinite storage 
capacity for any software available in market. Cloud has 
different applications that are hosted on their own dedicated 
server farms. Cloud has centralized server administration 
system. Centralized server administers the system, balances 
client supply, adjusts demands, monitors traffic and avoids 
congestion. This server follows protocols, commonly known 
as middleware.  Middleware controls the communication of 
cloud network among them. Cloud Architecture runs on a 
very important assumption, which is mostly true. The 
assumption is that the demand for resources is not always 
consistent from client to cloud. Because of this reason the 
servers of cloud are unable to run at their full capacity. To 
avoid this scenario, server virtualization technique is 
applied. In sever virtualization, all physical servers are 
virtualized and they run multiple servers with either same or 
different application. As one physical server acts as multiple  
 
                                                           
 
 
 
physical servers, it curtails the need for more physical 
machines. As a matter of fact, data is the most important part 
of cloud computing; thus, data security is the top most 
priority in all the data operations of cloud. Here, all the data 
are backed up at multiple locations. This astoundingly 
increases the data storage to multiple times in cloud 
compared with a regular system. Redundancy of data is 
crucial, which is a must-have attribute of cloud computing. 
Security of confidential data (e.g., SSN or Credit Card 
Numbers) is a very important area of concern as it can make 
way for very big problems if unauthorized users get access 
to it. Misuse of data can create big issues; hence, in cloud 
computing it is very important to be aware of data 
administrators and their extent of data access rights. Large 
organizations dealing with sensitive data often have well laid 
out regulatory compliance policies. However, these polices 
should be verified prior to engaging them in cloud 
computing. There is a possibility that in cloud computing 
network, sometimes the network utilizes resources from 
another country or they might not be fully protected; hence, 
the need arises for appropriate regulatory compliance 
policies. In cloud computing, it is very common to store data 
of multiple customers at one common location. Cloud 
computing should have proper techniques where data is 
segregated properly for data security and confidentiality. 
Care must be taken to ensure that one customer’s data does 
not affect another customer’s data. In addition, Cloud 
computing providers must be equipped with proper disaster 
recovery policies to deal with any unfortunate event. 
If we see architecture of the cloud computing that is used 
in many areas of current research and corporate world then it 
has Security as an important factor for selection of cloud 
configuration. Fig 1 shows the importance of security for 
various types of Clouds that are existing in current world.  
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According to the survey carried by NIST [1], for most of the 
big companies security is biggest concern for migrating their 
product to cloud. Cloud computing has lucrative offers 
economically and on the technical part but they are still 
concerned about the security managed by cloud they will 
hire. Fig-2 shows the statistics of the survey.  
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In this paper we will first discuss various aspects of 
security with security model that is been proposed by Jericho 
Forum[2], Followed by that we have discussed the CIA 
objectives of security related to cloud computing. In section 
4 we have discussed major threats in current world by 
categorizing them in Computation Security, Storage Security 
and Network Security. Each sub-section discusses the 
priority, reasons for those threats, and repercussions of that 
threat and possible solutions that are currently accepted by 
the industry. In the end paper is concluding about the current 
severity on security issues in cloud computing. 
 
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
Basically Cloud model can be broken down in mainly three 
layers: 1. Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) 2. Platform as a 
Service (PaaS) and 3. Software as a Service (SaaS). Here 
security for each layer has different issues but still they can 
be closely combined in to one cardinal framework. Jericho 
Forum has proposed a model for cloud computing which 
integrates Security (and Identity Managers) inside the layers 
of the cloud computing. Fig-3 shows the pictorial view of 
the Cloud Computing model. For evaluating the security for 
any cloud there are mainly CIA objectives are to be taken in 
consideration. CIA analysis includes 1. Confidentiality 2. 
Integrity and 3. Availability. For anyone to select the cloud 
provider one must have to consider the CIA objectives. 
Confidentiality is one of the prime constraints for the 
growth of cloud computing paradigm. Users when select the 
Cloud provide they must be sure that the data that is given to 
the provider must be confidential. Provider must protect it 
from other users as well as must provide surety that even 
provider will also not peep into the data. Typically 
confidentiality is maintained by the encryption of the data 
that has been uploaded on the server of provider. But 
encryption has huge drawback in performance of the system. 
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One other element within Confidentiality is the ability to 
destroy data.  In a cloud, that we do not own, and on storage 
media that we do not control, there is high –probability that 
the same media be used for other purposes.   These storage 
buckets are dynamic and the service /platform/ application 
provider might allocate them to other users. This sharing, 
and in many cases, repeated sharing, of storage media leads 
to the need for assured destruction. We must follow a strict 
regime that states how long is data to be kept, when and by 
whom destroyed, and how such destruction is verified. If we 
go in further detail the question of confidentiality become 
even more complicated. Also given problem is applicable to 
both storage and computation units of Cloud Computing. 
Integrity is important factor as well. Because for huge data 
user must be assured that whatever calculation is done by the 
cloud is done correctly without any minute errors. Also there 
should be some procedure that can assure the client that 
whatever data that will be stored on the file servers that will 
be stored without tempering any of the data. It will be in the 
same form and processed it without any assumption about 
the data. So Integrity requires two questions to be answered 
those are if data that is being computed is the original data 
and computation done on the data is error free and produces 
no harm effects on data or cloud models. Availability is 
most important concern for the users. They must be aware 
that what the availability ratio of the cloud provider is 
because availability of their product depends on the 
availability of the cloud. This is by far the most challenging 
issue for clouds. User has to be sure that how much of his 
data is available in case of corruption of existing data or 
what is the availability of the resources in cloud they are 
planning to buy. Because if it has no established recovery 
model or security threat solutions, then economic graph for 
that product will increase. 
III.  COMPUTATIONAL SECURITY 
 
Information security means protecting information 
and information systems from unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, perusal, inspection, 
recording or destruction. For many organizations, security of 
information is the most critical risk. This may be driven by a 
need to protect intellectual property, trade secrets, 
personally identifiable information, or other sensitive 
information. Making that sensitive information available on 
the Internet requires a significant investment in security 
  
 
 
controls and monitoring of access to the content and the 
pathways to the information. The logging and auditing 
controls provided by some vendors are not yet as robust as 
the logging provided within enterprises and enterprise 
applications. The challenge here is to ensure that, post 
incident, the organization has visibility to anyone who had 
access to the document and what might have been done to 
the document (edit, download, change access, etc.). 
Governments, military, corporations, financial 
institutions, hospitals, and private businesses amass a great 
deal of confidential information about their employees, 
customers, products, research, and financial status. Most of 
this information is now collected, processed and stored on 
electronic computers and transmitted across networks to 
other computers. Should confidential information about a 
business' customers or finances or new product line fall into 
the hands of a competitor, such a breach of security could 
lead to lost business, law suits or even bankruptcy of the 
business. Protecting confidential information is a business 
requirement, and in many cases also an ethical and legal 
requirement. While these concerns may not be absolute 
barriers to moving data storage and applications to the cloud 
environment, clearly they are significant obstacles that will 
require an enterprise to carefully examine its contractual 
obligations, risk profile, security infrastructure and oversight 
ability. An enterprise should be prepared to present the 
vendor with detailed security and legal requirements 
applicable to their business needs and the nature of the 
information being stored or transacted. 
 
Some of the issues while processing information on the 
cloud are presented below. 
A. Abuse and Nefarious use of Cloud Computing 
B. Resource Exhaustion 
C. Malicious Insider 
D. Insecure Interfaces and APIs 
E. Account or Service Hijacking 
 
A. Abuse and Nefarious use of Cloud Computing 
Cloud providers offer their customers the illusion of 
unlimited compute, network, and storage     capacity — 
often coupled with a ‘frictionless’ registration process where 
anyone with a valid credit card can register and immediately 
begin using cloud services. Some providers even offer free 
limited trial periods. By abusing the relative anonymity 
behind these registration and usage models, spammers, 
malicious code authors, and other criminals have been able 
to conduct their activities with relative impunity. The 
providers have traditionally suffered most from this kind of 
attacks; Future areas of concern include password and key 
cracking, DDOS[3], launching dynamic attack points, 
hosting malicious data, botnet command and control[4], 
building rainbow tables[5], and CAPTCHA solving 
farms[6]. 
 
Examples 
Cloud providers have experienced attacks like the Zeus 
botnet[7], InfoStealer trojan horses and downloads for 
Microsoft Office and Adobe PDF exploits. Additionally, 
botnets have used cloud servers for command and control 
functions. Spam continues to be a problem — as a defensive 
measure, entire blocks of infected network addresses have 
been publicly blacklist. 
Remediation 
• Stricter initial registration and validation processes. 
• Enhanced credit card fraud monitoring and 
coordination. 
• Comprehensive introspection of customer network 
traffic. 
• Monitoring public blacklists for one’s own network 
blocks. 
 
Impact 
Criminals continue to leverage new technologies to improve 
their reach, avoid detection, and improve the effectiveness of 
their activities. Cloud Computing providers are actively 
being targeted, partially because their relatively weak 
registration systems facilitate anonymity, and providers’ 
fraud detection capabilities are limited. 
 
B. Resource Exhaustion 
Resource Exhaustion happens when the cloud management 
does not properly restrict the size or amount of resources 
that are requested or influenced by an actor, which can be 
used to consume more resources than intended. 
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, 
database connection pool entries, or CPU. If an attacker can 
trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the 
number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the 
attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all 
available resources. This would prevent valid users from 
accessing the software, and it could potentially have an 
impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a 
memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow 
down the application as well as its host operating system. 
Resource exhaustion problems have at least two common 
causes: 
1. Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances  
2. Confusion over which part of the program is 
responsible for releasing the resource 
Consequences 
• The most common result of resource exhaustion is 
denial of service. The software may slow down, 
crash due to unhandled errors, or lock out 
legitimate users. 
• In some cases it may be possible to force the software to 
"fail open" in the event of resource exhaustion. The state of 
the software – and possibly the security functionality - may 
then be compromised. 
Detection Methods 
Automated Static Analysis 
Automated static analysis [8] typically has limited utility in 
recognizing resource exhaustion problems, except for 
program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, 
and processes. For system resources, automated static 
analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which 
resources are not released after they have expired. 
Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to 
detect settings that do not specify a maximum value. 
  
 
 
Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for 
detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an 
intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is 
only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day. 
Effectiveness: Limited 
 
Automated Dynamic Analysis 
Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques [8] may be 
effective in spotting resource exhaustion problems, 
especially with resources such as processes, memory, and 
connections. The technique may involve generating a large 
number of requests to the software within a short time frame. 
Effectiveness: Moderate 
 
Fuzzing 
While fuzzing [9] is typically geared toward finding low-
level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find resource 
exhaustion problems. This can occur when the fuzzer 
generates a large number of test cases but does not restart 
the targeted software in between test cases. If an individual 
test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then 
an inability to handle resource exhaustion may be the cause. 
Effectiveness: Opportunistic 
Example 
This code allocates a socket and forks each time it receives a 
new connection. 
sock=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); 
while (1)  
{ 
newsock=accept(sock, ...); 
printf("A connection has been accepted\n"); 
pid = fork(); 
} 
The program does not track how many connections have 
been made, and it does not limit the number of connections. 
Because forking is a relatively expensive operation, an 
attacker would be able to cause the system to run out of 
CPU, processes, or memory by making a large number of 
connections. Alternatively, an attacker could consume all 
available connections, preventing others from accessing the 
system remotely. 
C. Malicious Insider 
The threat of a malicious insider is well-known to most 
organizations. This threat is amplified for consumers of 
cloud services by the convergence of IT services and 
customers under a single management domain, combined 
with a general lack of transparency into provider process and 
procedure. For example, a provider may not reveal how it 
grants employees access to physical and virtual assets, how 
it monitors these employees, or how it analyzes and reports 
on policy compliance. To complicate matters, there is often 
little or no visibility into the hiring standards and practices 
for cloud employees. This kind of situation clearly creates an 
attractive opportunity for an adversary — ranging from the 
hobbyist hacker, to organized crime, to corporate espionage, 
or even nation-state sponsored intrusion. The level of access 
granted could enable such an adversary to harvest 
confidential data or gain complete control over the cloud 
services with little or no risk of detection. 
Remediation 
• Enforce strict supply chain management and conduct 
a comprehensive supplier assessment. 
• Specify human resource requirements as part of legal 
contracts. 
• Require transparency into overall information 
security and management practices, as well as 
compliance reporting. 
• Determine security breach notification processes. 
 
Impact 
The impact that malicious insiders can have on an 
organization is considerable, given their level of access and 
ability to infiltrate organizations and assets. Brand damage, 
financial impact, and productivity losses are just some of the 
ways a malicious insider can affect an operation. As 
organizations adopt cloud services, the human element takes 
on an even more profound importance. It is critical therefore 
that consumers of cloud services understand what providers 
are doing to detect and defend against the malicious insider 
D. Insecure Interfaces and APIs 
Cloud computing providers expose a set of software 
interfaces or APIs that customers use to manage and interact 
with cloud services. Provisioning, management, 
orchestration, and monitoring are all performed using these 
interfaces. The security and availability of general cloud 
services is dependent upon the security of these basic APIs. 
From authentication and access control to encryption and 
activity monitoring, these interfaces must be designed to 
protect against both accidental and malicious attempts to 
circumvent policy. Furthermore, organizations and third 
parties often build upon these interfaces to offer value-added 
services to their customers. This introduces the complexity 
of the new layered API; it also increases risk, as 
organizations may be required to relinquish their credentials 
to third- parties in order to enable their agency. 
 
Examples 
Anonymous access and/or reusable tokens or passwords, 
clear-text authentication or transmission of content, 
inflexible access controls or improper authorizations, limited 
monitoring and logging capabilities, unknown service or API 
dependencies. 
 
Remediation 
• Analyze the security model of cloud provider 
interfaces. 
• Ensure strong authentication and access controls are 
implemented in concert with encrypted 
transmission. 
• Understand the dependency chain associated with the 
API. 
 
Impact 
While most providers strive to ensure security is well 
integrated into their service models, it is critical for 
consumers of those services to understand the security 
implications associated with the usage, management, 
  
 
 
orchestration and monitoring of cloud services. Reliance on 
a weak set of interfaces and APIs exposes organizations to a 
variety of security issues related to confidentiality, integrity, 
availability and accountability. 
E. Account or Service Hijacking: 
Account or service hijacking is not new. Attack methods 
such as phishing [10], fraud, and exploitation of software 
vulnerabilities still achieve results. Credentials and 
passwords are often reused, which amplifies the impact of 
such attacks. Cloud solutions add a new threat to the 
landscape. If an attacker gains access to your credentials, 
they can eavesdrop on your activities and transactions, 
manipulate data, return falsified information, and redirect 
your clients to illegitimate sites. Your account or service 
instances may become a new base for the attacker. From 
here, they may leverage the power of your reputation to 
launch subsequent attacks. 
 
Remediation 
• Prohibit the sharing of account credentials between 
users and services. 
• Leverage strong two-factor authentication techniques 
where possible. 
• Employ proactive monitoring to detect unauthorized 
activity. 
• Understand cloud provider security policies and 
SLAs. 
 
Impact 
Account and service hijacking, usually with stolen 
credentials, remains a top threat. With stolen credentials, 
attackers can often access critical areas of deployed cloud 
computing services, allowing them to compromise the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of those services. 
Organizations should be aware of these techniques as well as 
common defense in depth protection strategies to contain the 
damage (and possible litigation) resulting from a breach. 
 
IV. STORAGE SECURITY 
Many experts in government and commerce still consider the 
greatest barrier to adoption of cloud services to be concerns 
about information security and privacy. While these risks 
exist across the entire cloud ecosystem, every cloud 
customer retains responsibility for assessing and 
understanding the value and sensitivity of the data they may 
choose to move to the cloud. As the owners of that 
information, cloud customers also remain accountable for 
decisions regarding the protection of that data wherever it 
may be stored. Organizations considering moving services to 
the cloud should keep these information security challenges 
in mind as they determine cloud adoption strategies: 
• A growing interdependence amongst public and private 
sector entities and the people they serve continues to 
develop as government, industry, and commercial 
groups work to establish more widely accepted 
definitions of cloud computing. While those definitions 
and the associated standards continue to be created, one 
cloud requirement is clear—that platform services and 
hosted applications be secure and available. 
•    The cloud—however it is defined—is a dynamic hosting 
environment in which technologies and business 
models continue to evolve. This continuous change is a 
security challenge that cloud providers must address 
through an effective and dynamic security program. 
•     Sophisticated malicious attempts aimed at obtaining 
identities or blocking access to sensitive business data 
threaten to undermine the willingness of organizations 
to adopt cloud services. Cloud providers must prove 
that they have put into place and constantly evaluate the 
effectiveness of the technologies, controls, and 
processes used to mitigate such disruptions. 
•     In addition to these challenges, cloud providers must 
also address the myriad requirements related to 
delivering services globally online including those 
coming from governments, legal rulings, and industry 
standards. 
In short, cloud service providers need to manage information 
security risks in a way that engenders trust with their 
customers—the government organizations or businesses that 
do provide such services to end users, as well as directly 
with end users. 
Some of the issues while processing information on the 
cloud are presented below. 
 
A. Shared Technology Issues  
B. Data loss and Leakage 
C. Insecure and Ineffective deletion of data 
 
A. Shared Technology Issues: 
Cloud vendors deliver their services in a scalable way by 
sharing infrastructure. Often, the underlying components that 
make up this infrastructure (e.g., CPU caches, GPUs, etc.) 
were not designed to offer strong isolation properties for a 
multi-tenant architecture. To address this gap, a 
virtualization hypervisor [11] mediates access between guest 
operating systems and the physical compute resources. Still, 
even hypervisors have exhibited flaws that have enabled 
guest operating systems to gain inappropriate levels of 
control or influence on the underlying platform. A defense in 
depth strategy is recommended, and should include compute, 
storage, and network security enforcement and monitoring. 
Strong compartmentalization should be employed to ensure 
that individual customers do not impact the operations of 
other tenants running on the same cloud provider. Customers 
should not have access to any other tenant’s actual or 
residual data, network traffic, etc. 
 
Examples 
• Joanna Rutkowska’s Red [12] and Blue Pill [13] 
exploits 
• Kortchinksy’s CloudBurst presentations. [14] 
 
Remediation 
• Implement security best practices for 
installation/configuration. 
• Monitor environment for unauthorized 
changes/activity. 
• Promote strong authentication and access control for 
administrative access and operations. 
  
 
 
• Enforce service level agreements for patching and 
vulnerability remediation. 
• Conduct vulnerability scanning and configuration 
audits. 
 
Impact 
Attacks have surfaced in recent years that target the shared 
technology inside Cloud Computing environments. Disk 
partitions, CPU caches, GPUs, and other shared elements 
were neverdesigned for strong compartmentalization. As a 
result, attackers focus on how to impact the operations of 
other cloud customers, and how to gain unauthorized access 
to data. 
B. Data Loss and Leakage: 
There are many ways to compromise data. Deletion or 
alteration of records without a backup of the original content 
is an obvious example. Unlinking a record from a larger 
context may render it unrecoverable, as can storage on 
unreliable media. Loss of an encoding key may result in 
effective destruction. Finally, unauthorized parties must be 
prevented from gaining access to sensitive data. The threat 
of data compromise increases in the cloud, due to the 
number of and interactions between risks and challenges 
which are either unique to cloud, or more dangerous because 
of the architectural or operational characteristics of the cloud 
environment. 
Examples 
Insufficient authentication, authorization, and audit controls; 
inconsistent use of encryption and software keys; operational 
failures; persistence and remanence challenges: disposal 
challenges; risk of association; jurisdiction and political 
issues; data center reliability; and disaster recovery. 
 
Remediation 
• Implement strong API access control. 
• Encrypt and protect integrity of data in transit. 
• Analyzes data protection at both design and run time. 
• Implement strong key generation, storage and 
management and destruction practices. 
• Contractually demand providers wipe persistent 
media before it is released into the pool. 
• Contractually specify provider backup and retention 
strategies. 
 
Impact 
Data loss or leakage can have a devastating impact on a 
business. Beyond the damage to one’s brand and reputation, 
a loss could significantly impact employee, partner, and 
customer morale and trust. Loss of core intellectual property 
could have competitive and financial implications. Worse 
still, depending upon the data that is lost or leaked, there 
might be compliance violations and legal ramifications. 
 
Good Standard for Data Security 
Open PGP [15] is considered as a better standard for data 
security. Open PGP combines symmetric and asymmetric 
encryption schemes to form a security model that not only 
protects the data but does so in a way that is practical and 
does not compromise the performance of the system. 
Symmetric encryption, where the same key is used to 
encrypt and decrypt, tends to be fast at encrypting lots of 
data. The Advanced Encryption Standard AES – 256 is a 
symmetric encryption scheme used by the U.S. government. 
 
 
 
The 256 indicates the size of the key in bits. Open PGP uses 
symmetric encryption like AES-256 to encrypt data and 
asymmetric encryption like RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Aldeman) 
to encrypt the keys used by AES-256. Asymmetric 
encryption simplifies key management, but is generally 
slower than symmetric encryption. This hybrid approach 
using the fast symmetric encryption to encrypt data and the 
slower asymmetric encryption only to encrypt the 
(comparatively small) keys allows data to be encrypted 
efficiently and a high level of granularity. Every data packet 
in the cloud can be protected separately with its own 
symmetric key and those keys can be managed together 
through their combined asymmetric key. This allows a 
practical level of control and granularity of keys and 
encrypted objects. The asymmetric keys can be maintained 
by the user in a key ring that becomes the single point of 
access control to the whole system. 
 
C. Insecure or Ineffective deletion of data 
Whenever a provider is changed, resources are scaled down, 
physical hardware is reallocated, etc, data may be available 
beyond the lifetime specified in the security policy. It may 
be impossible to carry out the procedures specified by the 
security policy, since full data deletion is only possible by 
destroying a disk, which also stores data from other clients. 
When a request to delete a cloud resource is made, this may 
not result in true wiping of the data (as with most operating 
systems). Where true data wiping is required, special 
procedures must be followed and this may not be supported 
by the standard API (or at all). 
 
If effective encryption is used then the level of risk may be 
considered to be lower. 
 
Remediation  
Good encryption strategies 
Good Timely deletion Strategies 
 
Impact 
Personal sensitive data and credentials are affected. 
 
  
 
 
V. NETWORK SECURITY 
 
Since cloud computing uses the Internet as the 
communication media for providing different computing 
services like SaaS,PaaS, IaaS, it is vulnerable to various 
network security threats. This section explains various 
network security threats that could occur on the cloud and 
the possible ways of prevention/mitigation of those attacks. 
 
The following are some of the network security threats that 
can cause damage on the cloud computing system. 
 
A. Flooding attacks such as Dos and DDos 
B. Data Interception attacks 
C. Management Interface attacks 
D. Cloud Malware attacks 
E. Metadata spoofing attacks 
 
A. Flooding Attacks 
 
A major aspect of Cloud Computing consists in outsourcing 
basic operational tasks to a Cloud system provider [16]. 
Among these basic tasks, one of the most important ones is 
server hardware maintenance. Thus, instead of operating an 
own, internal data center, the paradigm of Cloud Computing 
enables companies (users) to rent server hardware on 
demand (IaaS). This approach provides valuable economic 
benefits when it comes to dynamics in server load, as for 
instance day-and-night cycles can be attenuated by having 
the data traffic of different time zones operated by the same 
servers. Thus, instead of buying sufficient server hardware 
for the high workload times, Cloud Computing enables a 
dynamic adaptation of hardware requirements to the actual 
workload occurring. 
Technically, this achievement can be realized by using 
virtual machines deployed on arbitrary data center servers of 
the Cloud system. If a company’s demand on computational 
power rises, it simply is provided with more instances of 
virtual machines for its services. Under security 
considerations, this architecture has a serious drawback. 
Though the feature of providing more computational power 
on demand is appreciated in the case of valid users, it poses 
severe troubles in the presence of an attacker. The 
corresponding threat is that of flooding attacks, which 
basically consist in an attacker sending a huge amount of 
nonsense requests to a certain service. As each of these 
requests has to be processed by the service implementation 
in order to determine its invalidity, this causes a certain 
amount of workload per attack request, which—in the case 
of a flood of requests—usually would cause a Denial of 
Service to the server hardware [16]. In the specific case of 
Cloud Computing systems, the impact of such a flooding 
attack is expected to be amplified drastically. 
 
Direct Denial of Service 
 
When the Cloud Computing operating system notices the 
high workload on the flooded service, it will start to provide 
more computational power (more VMs) more service 
instances...) to cope with the additional workload. Thus, the 
server hardware boundaries for maximum workload to 
process do no longer hold. In that sense, the Cloud system is 
trying to work against the attacker (by providing more 
computational power), but actually—to some extent—even 
supports the attacker by enabling him to do most possible 
damage on a service’s availability, starting from a single 
flooding attack entry point. Thus, the attacker does not have 
to flood all n servers that provide a certain service in target, 
but merely can flood a single, Cloud-based address in order 
to perform a full loss of availability on the intended service 
[16]. 
 
Indirect Denial of Service Attacks 
 
Depending on the computational power in control of the 
attacker, a side effect of the direct flooding attack on a 
Cloud service potentially consists in that other services 
provided on the same hardware servers may suffer from the 
workload caused by the flooding. Thus, if a service instance 
happens to run on the same server with another, flooded 
service instance, this may affect its own availability as well. 
Once the server’s hardware 
resources are completely exhausted by processing the 
flooding attack requests, obviously also the other service 
instances on the same hardware machine are no 
longer able to perform their intended tasks. Thus, the 
Denial of Service of the targeted service instances are 
likely to cause a Denial of Service on all other services 
deployed to the same server hardware as well. 
Depending on the level of sophistication of the Cloud 
system, this side-effect may worsen if the Cloud system 
notices the lack of availability, and tries to “evacuate” the 
affected service instances to other servers. This results in 
additional workload for those other servers, and thus the 
flooding attack “jumps over” to another service type, and 
spreads throughout the whole computing Cloud. In the worst 
case, an adversary manages to utilize another (or the very 
same) Cloud Computing system for hosting his flooding 
attack application. In that case, the race in power would play 
both Cloud systems off against each other; each Cloud 
would provide more and more computational resources for 
creating, respectively fending, the flood, until one of them 
eventually reaches full loss of availability [16].       
Examples 
 
The following is one of the incidents of a Dos attack on 
Amazon cloud Posted in Enterprise Security, 5th October 
2009 15:32 GMT 
“DDoS attack rains down on Amazon cloud” 
Web-based code hosting service Bitbucket experienced more 
than 19 hours of downtime over the weekend after an 
apparent DDoS attack (flooding of millions of UDP packets) 
on the sky-high compute infrastructure it rents from 
Amazon.com. 
 
Remediation 
• Usage of load balancers to mitigate the incoming 
aggregated traffic by routing the requests to 
different servers. 
• Anycast networking concept wherein the same 
content is served from different physical and 
geographical servers. 
  
 
 
• Blackholing - Traffic to victim is redirected to a 
black hole(null interface, invalid server etc) 
• Sinkholing using in-depth packet inspection 
 
 
Remediation strategies used by Cloud Providers:- 
 
Microsoft:- 
• Microsoft applies several layers of security as 
appropriate to data center devices and network 
connections [17] 
• Specialized hardware such as load balancers, 
firewalls, and intrusion prevention devices, is in 
place to manage volume-based denial of service 
(DoS) attacks [17]. 
• Through network hardware, Microsoft uses 
application gateway functions to perform deep 
packet inspection and take actions such as sending 
alerts based on—or blocking—suspicious network 
traffic[17]. 
Amazon:- 
• Uses standard DDoS mitigation techniques such as 
sync cookies and connection limiting [18]. 
• Amazon maintains internal bandwidth which 
exceeds its provider-supplied Internet bandwidth. 
 
B. Cloud Malware Injection Attack 
 
A first considerable attack attempt aims at injecting a 
malicious service implementation or virtual machine into 
the Cloud system. Such kind of Cloud malware could 
serve any particular purpose the adversary is interested in, 
ranging from eavesdropping via subtle data modifications 
to full functionality changes or blockings. This attack 
requires the adversary to create its own malicious service 
implementation module (SaaS or PaaS) or virtual machine 
instance (IaaS), and add it to the Cloud system. Then, the 
adversary has to trick the Cloud system so that it treats the 
new service implementation instance as one of the valid 
instances for the particular service attacked by the 
adversary. If this succeeds, the Cloud system 
automatically redirects valid user requests to the malicious 
service implementation, and the adversary’s code is 
executed [16]. 
       
Remediation 
A promising countermeasure approach to this threat 
consists in the Cloud system performing a service 
instance integrity check prior to using a service instance 
for incoming requests. This can e.g. be done by storing a 
hash value on the original service instance’s image file 
and comparing this value with the hash values of all new 
service instance images. Thus, an attacker would be 
required to trick that hash value comparison in order to 
inject his malicious instances into the Cloud system [16]. 
Another approach to counter malware attack is to 
periodically scan the cloud systems for any suspected 
application such as worm/Trojan/malware etc. 
 
 
 
 
Remediation strategies used by Cloud Providers:- 
 
Amazon:- 
Amazon uses HackAlert™  [20], a malware monitoring 
and detection software delivered as SaaS to protect the 
customer websites from cloud malware attack. 
HackAlert™ connects to the monitored website over a 
standard HTTP connection and captures all responses in 
deliberately unsecured "Honey Clients" located at 
Armorize data centers worldwide. All website responses 
are analyzed for the presence of both active malware 
content and suspicious links (to external sites not 
currently distributing malware). This distinction greatly 
reduces the amount of false positives.  
 
Impact 
Any malware attack could destroy the intellectual property 
of the cloud provider as well as the customers as their 
confidential data could be kept in the cloud system. Usually 
a malware attack attempts to retrieve the user credential 
information and use the same to retrieve critical information 
from the system. This type of attack could degrade the 
reputation and trust of the cloud provider. 
 
Examples 
“MALWARE ATTACK USES CHINA WORLD EXPO GUISE” [19] 
 
Posted by Owen Fletcher March 25, 2010 06:12 AM ET 
 
A malware attack dressed up as an e-mail from organizers of 
the upcoming Shanghai World Expo targeted at least three 
foreign journalists in China, in the latest sign of increasingly 
sophisticated cyber attacks from the country. 
The e-mail appeared to be sent from the inbox of the Expo 
news office, but it was not sent by the Expo and may be 
targeting journalists who signed up to cover the event 
 
C. Data Interception Attack 
 
Cloud computing, being a distributed architecture, implies 
more data in transit than traditional infrastructures. For 
example, data must be transferred in order to synchronise 
multiple distributed machine images, images distributed 
across multiple physical machines, between cloud 
infrastructure and remote web clients, etc. Furthermore, most 
use of data-centre hosting is implemented using a secure 
VPN-like connection environment, a practice not always 
followed in the cloud context. Sniffing, spoofing, man-in–
the-middle attacks, side channel and replay attacks should be 
considered as possible threat sources. Moreover, in some 
cases the Cloud Provider does not offer a confidentiality or 
non-disclosure clause or these clauses are not sufficient to 
guarantee respect for the protection of the customer’s secret 
information and ‘know-how’ that will circulate in the ‘cloud’ 
[21].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Types of Data Interception Attacks 
 
Sniffing  
This attack involves sniffing and manipulating packets 
flowing through the cloud network or between web browser 
and the cloud system.  
 
Spoofing 
This kind of interception is done by sending illegitimate 
connection requests and messages from invalid sources. The 
scatter effect produced are utilized to produce further attacks 
on the cloud. 
 
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks 
This kind of attack involves interception of traffic by being 
in the middle of the traffic flowing between the cloud and 
the intended recipient. Spoofed data is sent to both the 
endpoints. 
 
Side Channel Attack 
This kind of attack involves using timing information, power 
consumption, electromagnetic leaks or even sound to break 
the system. 
 
Possible Threat sources 
AAA (Authentication, Authorization, Accounting) 
Vulnerability 
 
A poor system for authentication, authorization and 
accounting, could facilitate unauthorized access to resources, 
privileges escalation, impossibility of tracking the misuse of 
resources and security incidents in general, etc, through:  
 
• Insecure storage of cloud access credentials by 
customer 
• Insufficient roles available 
• Credentials stored on a transitory machine.  
 
Furthermore, the cloud makes password based authentication 
attacks (trend of fraudster using a Trojan to steal corporate 
passwords) much more impactful since corporate 
applications are now exposed on the Internet. Therefore 
password-based authentication will become insufficient and 
a need for stronger or two-factor authentication for accessing 
cloud resources will be necessary [21].  
 
Communication Encryption vulnerabilities 
These vulnerabilities concern the possibility of reading data 
in transit via, for example, MITM attacks, poor 
authentication, acceptance of self-signed certificates, etc 
[21]. 
 
Weak Encryption of archives and data in Transit 
 
Failure to encrypt data in transit, data held in archives and 
databases, un-mounted virtual machine images, forensic 
images and data, sensitive logs and other data at rest puts the 
data at risk. Of course the costs of implementing key 
management and processing costs must be taking account 
and set against the business risk introduced [21]. 
 
 
Remediation  
 
The strategy to counter date interception attacks is to  
• Have a strong AAA system which does not expose 
any vulnerability for unauthorized access/unclear role 
definitions. 
• Have a strong encryption scheme for the data and 
control traffic between the cloud systems as well as 
between the customer and the cloud provider. 
 
D. Management Interface Attack 
 
The customer management interfaces of public cloud 
providers are Internet accessible and mediate access to 
larger sets of resources (than traditional hosting providers) 
and therefore pose an increased risk especially when 
combined with remote access and web browser 
vulnerabilities. This includes customer interfaces controlling 
a number of virtual machines and, most importantly, Cloud 
Provider interfaces controlling the operation of the overall 
cloud system. Of course, this risk may be mitigated by more 
investment in security by providers [21]. 
 
Threat Sources 
 
One of the sources for the management interface attack is the 
AAA vulnerability. Lack of or inefficient challenge response 
system during the authentication through remote clients 
could cause attack on the management interfaces. 
Another possible source of this attack could be 
misconfiguration of specific key parameters of the cloud 
system. This could be due to:  
• Inadequate application of security baseline  
• Invalid or incorrect implementation of hardening 
procedures 
• Human error and untrained administrator 
Misconfiguration or a known OS or System vulnerability 
could also cause a management interface attack. For 
example conflicting patching procedures used between the 
customer and the cloud provider could result in 
misconfiguration of the cloud system. 
 
Remediation 
Management interfaces should be exposed in the form of a 
secure channel. Instead of the password based 
authentication, it should use two-factor authentication. 
Periodic and efficient OS and hardware hardening 
procedures should be followed on the cloud system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Cloud computing is the next big wave in computing. It has 
many benefits, such as better hardware management, since 
all the computers are the same and run the same hardware. It 
also provides for better and easier management of data 
security, since all the data is located on a central server, so 
administrators can control who has and doesn't have access 
to the files. It is widely accepted today because of its 
economic benefits.  
 
 
  
 
 
There are some down sides as well to cloud computing. Out 
of those down falls one of the major factors is security. User 
will have to evaluate the security model that is been used by 
Cloud Provider makes lot of impact on taking the decision of 
the selecting the cloud provider. Also for Cloud Computing 
there is more number of threats than compare to security of 
single PC because clouds have many elements than single 
PC.  
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